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NonModern Education, or, Education Without Qualities:  
An Essay on Robert Musil’s Essayism 
Matthew Clarke 




Contemporary education systems are premised on the assumption that knowledge 
can be mapped as official curriculum and learning predetermined as outcomes that 
all students are expected to achieve; we take it for granted that learning can be 
measured and compared through standardised assessment; and we assume that 
teaching can be codified as “evidence based” “best practice” and that teachers’ 
work can be delineated and prescribed in the form of teacher professional standards. 
In each case the “qualities” of education—knowledge, teaching and learning—are 
assumed to be knowable and amenable to modernist tropes of clear, certain, 
systematic and comprehensive articulation. As a way of opening up space for 
alternative ways of thinking about education, this paper explores the essayism of 
twentieth century Austrian writer, Robert Musil, author of The Man Without 
Qualities (1995 [1940]), in order to consider the idea of a “nonmodern” education 
without qualities—an education that would engage with ideas and experience 
without reinscribing them within modernity’s characteristic clarity, certainty, 
systematicity and comprehensiveness. What would such an education entail for 
curriculum, pedagogy and assessment? What would it say about who we might be 
and what we aspire to become as individuals and as a society? This exploratory 
paper ends with some thoughts on the democratic implications of essayism as a 
mode of nonmodern education. 
 




This paper is written as the modern world is poised on the brink of the fourth 
industrial revolution. With its implicit blurring of boundaries between the 
biological, physical and digital realms, commentators and analysts expect this 
revolution to reshape all disciplines and domains (Schwab, 2016), rendering 
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redundant the predictable and instrumental pathways linking education and society 
under modernity. At the same time, factors such as the rise of “big data,” 
commercialised curricula, the corporatisation of educational provision and the 
globalisation of education policy are contributing to the intensification of 
educational governance at global and local scales (Jules, 2016; Rizvi & Lingard, 
2010), thereby, it could be argued, reinscribing the fundamental “grammar” of 
modern school education (Hartley, 2012; Tyack & Tobin, 1994).  
Against this backdrop, the paper explores the essayism of the early twentieth 
century Austrian writer and novelist, Robert Musil, author of The man without 
qualities (MWQ, 1995 [1940]), in order to consider the idea of a “nonmodern” 
education without qualities. This would be an education that would engage with 
ideas and experience without reinscribing them within modernity’s characteristic 
clarity, certainty, systematicity and comprehensiveness, thereby unsettling 
comfortable and comforting attachments to received notions of knowledge, identity, 
culture, nation or empire (Freed, 2011; Jonsson, 2000; McBride, 2006). What would 
such an education entail for curriculum, pedagogy and assessment? What would it 
say about who we might be and what we aspire to become as individuals and as a 
society? This exploratory paper can only gesture towards most of the matters but 
concludes with some thoughts on the implications for policy and pedagogy of 
essayism as a mode of nonmodern education. 
 
Modernity, production and education 
As reference to the fourth industrial revolution suggests, modernity was built upon 
three prior technological revolutions. The first of these occurred in engineering, 
machinery and transport, laying the foundations for modern industry. The second 
revolution saw electricity harnessed for communication and lighting as well as to 
power the elevators that allowed the construction of the modern high-rise city. The 
third revolution saw developments in chemistry which were the basis for the growth 
of plastics and other synthetic materials that have become so entangled with modern 
life. These developments and innovations, however, were not merely of technical 
interest and concern but required re-formation of the human subject in terms of 
attitudes towards authority, time and space (Hartley, 2012, pp. 10-14). Space was 
regulated by being divided and compartmentalised according to function within the 
factory walls, with the production line serving as the epitome of this organisation. 
Time was managed though the division of the day and night into shifts, through 
punctuation by the clock and through its verification on the timecard. Compliance 
with authority was induced through calculation in the form of wage payments; 
though coercion in terms of potential harassment; and through normalisation in 
terms of moral pressures to conform to management’s requirements. 
But the advent of modernity was not limited to the utilisation of particular 
technological developments within processes of economic production and the 
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reform of those providing the labour required to sustain production. Life in modern 
societies more generally, not least in educational institutions, is inscribed by 
modernity, with its characteristic emphases on certainty, formal rationality and a 
desire for a “clean slate” (Toulmin, 1990). Certainty in education is evident in the 
ways in which knowledge is sequenced in linear fashion in curricula and syllabi and 
mapped to age levels in terms of “outcomes.” Formal rationality finds echoes in the 
modes of temporal and spatial organisation typically found in educational 
institutions, where time and space are organised and managed in ways that echo 
those of the modern factory. The year is divided into terms and semesters while the 
school building is divided into classrooms connected by halls and corridors. In both 
spatial and temporal terms, the institution’s concern is to maximise efficiency and 
productivity by, for instance, ensuring scope for hierarchical, panoptic oversight 
(i.e., super-vision) by teachers to prevent excessive movement, the wasting of time 
and ill-directed effort. The cultivation, inculcation and internalisation of these good 
habits are reinforced by the requirement to complete homework. Meanwhile, the 
modern penchant for the clean slate is reflected in the perpetual reinvention of 
education through policy reforms, which neither take account of their antecedents, 
nor allow sufficient time for their effects to become embedded before they are 
superseded by subsequent reforms. 
The provision of mass primary school education in the nineteenth century was 
tailored to provide this spatial, temporal and moral training to the children of the 
urban masses—and society’s future workforce—converging on cities in response to 
industrialisation’s need for labour. These historical traces are still evident in the 
dominant forms of education in the twenty first century with their emphasis on 
uniformity and standardisation. Indeed, the parallels between the modern factory 
and education seems even more apt in the current neoliberal era, as achievement in 
relation to testable knowledge becomes the paramount concern of policy makers 
and, as a consequence of washback effects, of school leaders, teachers, parents and 
students. Coffield and Williamson highlight this growing instrumentalism
1
 in which 
exam results function in much the same way as the goods produced in our factories:  
 
our schools, colleges and universities have been turned into exam 
factories, where teaching to the test and gaining qualifications and 
learning techniques to pass exams are now what matters, rather than 
understanding or being interested in, or loving, the subjects being studied 
(2011, p. 46).  
 
                                                          
1
Though it could be argued that mass education has always been, to some degree at least, an instrumental 
concern, focused on providing workers fit for the economy. 
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The reference to schools as exam factories, however, highlights not only the 
objectification and reification of knowledge but also the subjection and 
objectification of those who are subjects of education and who are thus made visible 
in order to be individuated, compared and classified: 
 
The examination combines the techniques of an observing hierarchy and 
those of normalizing judgement….In it are combined the ceremony of 
power and the form of the experiment, the deployment of force and the 
establishment of truth. At the heart of the procedures of discipline, it 
manifests the subjection of those who are perceived as objects and the 
objectification of those who are subjected (Foucault, 1977, pp. 184-185). 
 
Contemporary neoliberal education systems are premised on the modernist 
assumption that knowledge can be organised and mapped as official curriculum 
(Kelly, 2009), that learning can be predetermined as outcomes that all students are 
expected to achieve (Stoller, 2015), and that this learning can be measured through 
tests and exams and compared at various scales from the local to the global through 
standardised assessment (Sellar, Thompson, & Rutkowski, 2017; Stobart, 2008). In 
a similar vein, neoliberal policy makers assume that teachers’ work can be 
delineated and prescribed in the form of teacher professional standards (Clarke & 
Moore, 2013; Taubman, 2009) and that maximally effective and efficient pedagogy 
can be codified as “evidence based” “best practice.” In each case, the product of 
education—knowledge—and the truth, or “qualities,” of those subjected to 
education—individuals, institutions and indeed, education systems—are assumed to 
be knowable and amenable to clear, certain, systematic and comprehensive 
articulation. So what might an education without qualities look like? 
  
Robert Musil and The Man Without Qualities 
 
Wouldn’t it be more original to try to live, not as a definite person in a 
definite world where only a few buttons need adjusting—what we call 
evolution—but rather to behave from the start as someone born to change 
surrounded by a world created to change? (MWQ, p. 295). 
 
The modern world of education is one of measurement and testing, of prediction 
and evaluation, of calculation and comparison. It is a world that, in its efforts to 
ensure quality and eradicate risk has ended up sapping the vital life-force from 
education. It would be surprising if the modern subject occupying this world, did 
not occasionally feel the frustration voiced by Musil’s alter-ego in The Man Without 
Qualities, Ulrich, when he wistfully asks the question above, positing a vision of 
life as an arena of possibilities in contrast to the modernist certainty that has 
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calcified into the neoliberal mantra of TINA
2
. But who was Robert Musil, author of 
the man without qualities? 
The Austrian writer and philosopher, Robert Musil, was initially trained as an 
engineer but he also studied mathematics, psychology and philosophy, gaining a 
doctorate in the latter discipline, before becoming a writer. He occupies a somewhat 
ambivalent position as a highly respected but also rather neglected figure, one who 
belongs to that category of writers more often cited than read. This ambivalence is 
reflected in the nature of his encyclopaedic novel, The Man Without Qualities. This 
is a book in which there is scarcely a page that does not present profound, 
penetrating and provocative philosophical discussion and yet in which scarcely 
anything happens, to the extent that The Man Without Qualities might be described 
as a novel without a plot. Written in the years of crisis between the two world wars 
of the twentieth century, the novel seeks to capture and summarise the cultural and 
political milieu of the period in Europe. A vast canvas, it veers from mysticism to 
war, from the musings of an incarcerated sociopathic murderer to popular uprisings 
in the streets, from mocking accounts of the party tittle-tattle of Vienna’s bourgeois 
to a celebration of adult sibling incest, and from dry explanations of scientific 
problems to lyrical accounts of timeless philosophical questions.  
The sprawling novel, unfinished at the time of his death in exile in Switzerland 
in 1942, despite his having worked on it for thirty years, is set in Vienna during 
1913-1914. In brief, the protagonist, Ulrich, the man without qualities of the novel’s 
title, though extremely bright and talented, has lost his sense of direction and, after 
being summoned by his father, becomes the Secretary for the Parallel Campaign, 
the purpose of which is to unify all the peoples of “Kakania” (Musil’s name for the 
Habsburg Empire) in celebration of the seventieth anniversary of the ruler’s reign. 
While Ulrich fulfils his duties half-heartedly, a cast of other characters are gradually 
introduced, including individuals involved in the parallel campaign and 
acquaintances from Ulrich’s youth and childhood, until his father dies at the end of 
Part I. At the funeral Ulrich meets his long-forgotten sister and, after becoming 
mutually attracted to each other, they retreat from society with much of the 
remainder of the novel taken up with their conversations interspersed with 
depictions of political developments in Viennese society. According to his notes 
and papers, Musil’s unfulfilled intent was to bring these two strands into 
convergence at the end of the novel as Kakania’s peoples are united in disastrous 
celebrations at the outbreak of WWI. Such was not to be but in some ways this non-
ending seems fitting for a book concerned, amongst other things, with the 
essentially incomplete and unfinalizable nature of the human subject. 
 
                                                          
2
 This, of course, is a reference to Margaret Thatcher’s (in)famous declaration that there is no alternative 
to her preferred political vision. 
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The Musilian subject 
The novel’s parallel depiction of the Austro-Hungarian empire’s quest for its 
cultural essence and Ulrich’s realisation that he lacks any essential identity are part 
of its insistent rejection and rebuttal of any and all claims made in the name of 
cultural or collective identities. Overall, then, the novel challenges the idea that 
cultures and identities express inborn dispositions or inherent characteristics, 
instead suggesting that the human subject is historically constituted as a 
consequence of the ways in which it is named, gendered, educated and shaped by 
social institutions and cultural conventions. Musil suggests that values and beliefs 
derived from ideologies of nationalism, patriarchy and racism limit and restrict 
individuals and groups by making what is contingent seem natural and hence 
inescapable. In contrast, Musil’s novel articulates a view of the subject, more akin 
to that in Lacanian psychoanalysis, as an empty place—a sort of structural void 
around which life circulates without ever fully penetrating. In the following passage 
in Part I of the book, Clarisse has been listening to one of numerous heated debates 
between her husband, Walter, and his childhood friend, Ulrich: 
 
“There’s something impossible in every one of us. It explains so many 
things. While I was listening to you both, it seemed to me that if we could 
be cut open our entire life might look like a ring, just something that goes 
round something.” She had already, earlier on, pulled off her wedding 
ring, and now peered through it at the lamplit wall. “There’s nothing 
inside, and yet it looks as though that were precisely what matters most.” 
(MWQ, p. 401).  
 
Clarisse’s ring here acts almost like a telescope, providing a moment of insight into 
the emptiness of the subject and offering a form within which to focus for her 
depiction of the human subject as “just something that goes around something.” 
This depiction, uncannily, identifies the same empty space or void that characterizes 
certain psychoanalytic (Fink, 1995; Neill, 2011) and “posthuman” (Benjamin, 2016; 
Thweatt-Bates, 2016) conceptions of the human subject. This version of the subject 
is deeply unsettling to the modernist mindset, resting as it does on no firm 
foundations and containing no solid content. This is a subject that, in its fragile 
singularity, can be narrated but not defined (Cavarero, 2000). Elsewhere, Musil 
describes the deep unease and existential anxiety that accompanies such a notion of 
subjecthood: 
 
However understandable and self-contained everything seems, this is 
accompanied by an obscure feeling that it is only half the story. 
Something is not quite in balance, and a person presses forward, like a 
tightrope walker, in order not to sway and fall. And as he presses on 
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through life and leaves lived life behind, the life ahead and the life 
already lived form a wall, and his path in the end resembles the path of a 
woodworm: no matter how it corkscrews forward or even backward, it 
always leaves an empty space behind it. And this horrible feeling of a 
blind, cutoff space behind the fullness of everything, this half that is 
always missing even when everything is whole, this is what eventually 
makes one perceive what one calls the soul (MWQ, p. 196). 
 
Again, there are echoes here of psychoanalytic thought and what Eric Santner 
(2001) describes as a certain “undeadness” (p. 18) in humanity that is “generative of 
a disturbing surplus animation” (p. 19). Santner argues that a thin line separates our 
capacity to be animated by this surplus and a defensive shutting-down against its 
disturbing currents, akin to what Musil describes in terms of “this horrible feeling of 
a blind, cutoff space behind the fullness of everything.” But what we might refer to 
as the “uncanny vitality” (Santner, p. 37) animating our lives, as well as the 
correlative urge to suppress or extinguish this unsettling energy, clearly has 
implications at the level of the individual and her capacity for creativity in 
education and other domains. In this regard, it could be argued that modernity’s 
insistence on certainty and formal rationality, manifested in its strict management of 
time and space, knowledge and subjects, represents a stifling of the very source of 
the creativity that modern education policy makers claim to valorise. This also 
suggests that rescuing education from the grip of neoliberal assumptions will 
require a loosening of the pressures and constraints on time, space, knowledge and 
subjectivity and a replacement of the rule of “pedantic precision” (Freed, 2011, p. 
48) with an ethos of provisionality, possibility and experimentation. 
But the passage from Musil explicitly raises the question, implicit in the 
novel’s title, of the ontological status of the subject—what would it mean to be a 
“[hu]man,” i.e., a subject, without qualities? And what would the status of these 
qualities be without a subject to provide the solidity to which they could attach? 
This “nonmodern,” i.e., neither modern nor postmodern (Freed, 2011), subject is 
neither the pre-social subject of modernity, nor the mere product of social forces 
and discursive imprint, but is, paradoxically, a structural gap or void—it is that 
“half that is always missing even when everything is whole,” as Musil puts it above. 
If the modernist subject is the product of rational processes of clarification and 
purification the nonmodern subject reflects “the dereification of the ontological 
zones that purification institutes” (Freed, 2011, p. 33). Put another way, the notion 
of a subject without qualities shifts the emphasis from the ontical to the ontological; 
it is not about the what of the subject but about how the subject continually comes-
to-being; it is not about the content of subjectivity but about its potentiality-for-
being (Freed, 2011, p. 89). This view of the subject as beyond the limits of 
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representation reflects Musil’s Nietzschean
3
 attitude of circumspection towards the 
solidity of the subject and offers an alternative viewpoint from which to consider 
and critique the vision inherent in neoliberalism’s view of the entrepreneurial, self-
responsibilised subject who acts as a proprietor of their own qualities and seeks to 
maximise their exchange value in the marketplace of life. 
But it is not just biological or cultural determinism that Musil rejects. He is 
equally opposed to systematic philosophy, commenting in MWQ that “philosophers 
are despots who have no armies to command, so they subject the world to tyranny 
by locking it up in a system of thought” (MWQ, p. 272) and to scientific certainty 
for which he substitutes the alternative of living hypothetically. As Musil reflects in 
relation to Ulrich, 
 
He suspects that the given order of things is not as solid as it pretends to 
be; no thing, no self, no form, no principle is safe, everything is 
undergoing an invisible but ceaseless transformation, the unsettled holds 
more of the future than the settled, and the present is nothing but a 
hypothesis that has not yet been surmounted (MWQ, p 269). 
 
Unfortunately, such a nuanced, tentative reading of the world is inimical to the drive 
to certainty in modern education; as a consequence, “what is seemingly solid in this 
system becomes a porous pretext for many possible meanings; the event occurring 
becomes a symbol of something that perhaps may not be happening but that makes 
itself felt though the symbol” (MWQ, p. 270). The manufactured crises and pseudo-
scientificism that serve as vehicles and justifications for “evidence based policy”—
or what some commentators have depicted as “policy-based evidence making” 
(Strassheim & Kettunen, 2014)—come to mind as contemporary examples of this 
drive to certainty in relation to education.  
 
Beyond useful and certain knowledge: Essayism 
Education has a history of conceiving of the subjects of education—those who are 
to be educated—as passive receptacles to be filled. Such a view inheres in the 
mandating of state curricula that must be taught to all learners and the prescription 
of pre-specified outcomes that all learners must achieve. Such a perspective is 
grounded in a simplistic dualism between the individual and the world, in which the 
former internalises knowledge about the latter in order to put this knowledge to 
work on the latter in later life as a fully agentive adult. This view of the individual-
social relationship suggests limitless possibility, encouraging people to view the 
                                                          
3
 Musil is a philosophical novelist, whereas Nietzsche was a literary philosopher, but the latter exercised 
a considerable influence on the former, as he did on the wider generation of European critical thinkers 
who emerged in the early twentieth century (see Spencer, 2013). 
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world as an externality that exists purely for purposes of human entertainment and 
exploitation. 
In this regard it is worth noting that two of the dominant sciences in the 
contemporary Western world are surely biology and economics, two disciplines that 
purport to provide certain knowledge and that merge in the discourse known as 
biocapitalism. Biocapitalism involves a “synergy that has formed around scientific 
activity (especially the life sciences) and governmental policies and practices 
oriented towards the dissolution of biological and market barriers to growth” 
(Pierce, 2013, p. 24). Underlying both neoliberal politics and contemporary 
neoliberal education policy is a disavowal of negativity and a wilful belief in pure 
positivity that regards reality as “quantifiable, measurable and ultimately accessible 
as unequivocal presence” (De Klerk, 2009, p. 1). In other words, there is an 
underlying attempt to erase the fact that human life and existence depends on 
meaning making and that meaning making inevitably involves ideology; instead, 
education policy believes that it deals with things “as they are” (De Klerk, 2009, p. 
8). So rather than promoting a critically self-reflexive and socially responsible 
subjectivity, education becomes prescriptive in relation to a pre-determined 
economic and entrepreneurial vision of subjectivity.  
The rich complexity of Musil’s thought cannot receive adequate treatment in a 
brief paper such as this. But it is important to note that in his suspicion and 
scepticism towards systems of thought, Musil evinces a quality he shares with the 
French essayist, Michel de Montaigne, in terms of an awareness of the essential 
messiness and complexity of human experience and a suspicion towards the 
supposed objectivity of strictly logical connections amongst ideas. This leads to 
neither a pure rejection of rationality, nor an uncritical embrace of romanticism or 
subjectivism—something Musil referred to as “the Other Condition”—but to an 
awareness of the need for a reconceptualization of both in non-binary terms. This in 
turn leads Musil to embrace the provisional nature of the essay as a basis for a 
textual vision of human subjectivity that comprises both personality and external 
circumstances. As Ulrich states, “an essay, in the sequence of its paragraphs, 
explores a thing from many sides without wholly encompassing it—for a thing 
wholly encompassed suddenly loses its scope and melts down to a concept” (MWQ, 
p. 275). Elsewhere, Ulrich muses how 
 
the accepted translation of “essay” as “attempt” contains only vaguely the 
essential illusion to the literary model, for an essay is not a provisional or 
incidental expression of a conviction capable of being elevated to a truth 
under more favourable circumstances or being exposed as an error…an 
essay is rather the unique and unalterable form assumed by a man’s inner 
life in a decisive act of thought….Terms like true and false, wise and 
unwise, are equally inapplicable, and yet the essay is subject to laws that 
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are no less strict for appearing to be delicate and ineffable. There have 
been more than a few such essayists, masters of the inner hovering life, 
but there would be no point in naming them. Their domain lies between 
religion and knowledge, between example and doctrine, between amor 
intellectualis and poetry; they are saints with and without religion; and 
sometimes they are also simply men on an adventure who have gone 
astray (MWQ, p. 273). 
  
As the latter part of this quote suggests, in addition to comprising a discursive 
strategy for engaging and navigating the irregularities and complexities of a 
socially-situated human life, essayism for Musil is also a mode of subjectivity, one 
that is “suspended amid a network of determining forces” (Freed, 2011, p. 100) and 
which, as a result, is non-coincidental with itself—something reflected in Ulrich’s 
offhand remark, “there is nothing I am less fit for than being myself” (MWQ, p. 
296). This textual, as opposed to essential, subject is signalled in the novel’s title 
and even more so in the title of Chapter 39, A Man Without Qualities Consists of 
Qualities Without a Man. As Ulrich observes in this chapter in relation to his life,  
 
everything in it had fulfilled itself as if it belonged together more than it 
belonged to him….Therefore he had to suppose that the personal qualities 
he had achieved in this way had more to do with one another than with 
him; that every one of them, in fact, looked at closely, was no more 
ultimately bound up with him than with anyone else who also happened 
to possess them (MWQ, p, 157). 
 
All this suggests that just as the notion of a subject without qualities is less about 
the what and more about the how of its potentiality-for-being, so too a nonmodern 
education without qualities is less concerned with the content of knowledge and 
more about the process of coming-to-know; it is less about the precise specification 
of particular items of knowledge and more about the relationships among thoughts 
and ideas and their connections to lived experience. But just because the content of 
such an education cannot be prescribed does not mean, I suggest, that it lacks all 
rigour and order. Rather, as Freed puts it in one of the chapter titles of his book 
(2011, pp. 89-111), this opens up the possibility of a nonmodern education without 
qualities as an instance of “order without system.” 
 
Conclusion 
The first part of The Man Without Qualities, following a short introduction, is called 
Pseudoreality Prevails. Education in the twenty first century might be said to be 
characterised by pseudo-scientificism, embodied in the positivistic attitudes 
underlying much education policy, with its exhortations to pursue “evidence-based” 
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“best practice,” and reflected in much educational practice in schools which 
unconsciously repeats tropes and practices uncritically derived from industrial 
modernity. By contrast, Musil’s ideas, reflected in his epic novel, as well as his 
other writing comprising numerous essays and an earlier novella, invite us to 
acknowledge the emergent, irrational and “in-between” dimensions of the formation 
and transformation of both the subject and its knowledge, as well as the 
nonsemantic kernel that lies “below” the level of intentionality in all of us as 
simultaneously “unknowing” and “knowing” subjects of education. Such a 
perspective opens education to non-cognitive affective, embodied and unconscious 
modalities of thought, while also challenging easy and familiar distinctions such as 
subjective-objective, true-false, fact-fiction, thereby encouraging us to seek 
inspiration for our educational thought in sources such as literature and film, rather 
than just in the annals of social “scientific” knowledge. 
Importantly, for educators Musil’s essayism encourages us to resist the two-
dimensional, technically-oriented world of neoliberal policy where education is 
often reduced to a depoliticised, technical manual in the name of thinly disguised 
economic instrumentalism. Instead, Musil’s essaysim encourages us to recognize 
“the contingency of knowledge as well as the contingent ontology of the knowing 
subject” (Freed, 2011, p. 102); from this perspective, education might be rethought 
as an improvisational mode and relational space of listening that needs to be 
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